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Abstract  
One of the main challenges for the post-2015 agenda is to reach universal primary education 
for all children.  The last decade experienced a boom of social protection programs aimed at 
increasing school enrollment, mostly in the form of Conditional Cash Transfers.  These 
programs are mostly targeted to poor families and have proved to increase enrollment and 
attendance.  However, not all vulnerable children are benefiting from these programs. As 
more children are to be reached, there is a higher risk to incur in inclusion errors. This paper 
discusses the main challenges of targeting this type of programs and draws some lessons for 
improving targeting effectiveness.  It also highlights the importance of moving from 
enrollment and attendance to learning and attainment as we move forward towards reaching 
high education quality for all children. 
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Introduction  
The important link between education as human capital investment and poverty reduction has 
been established in the literature. It is necessary to increase the stock of human capital to 
alleviate poverty, as human capital is in fact also the main asset of most poor people (World 
Bank, 2000). In practice, recent development in poverty alleviation strategies has shifted its 
focus strategies to foster economic growth for everyone with its expected trickle-down effect 
towards the poor, to direct intervention programs targeted to the poor with social protection 
programs that alleviate poverty and at the same time help to promote human development.  
This includes programs which focus on the advancement of children’s educational 
attainment. As social protection programs are directed towards the poor, accurate targeting of 
the transfers become important.  
Targeting is an effort to identify and ensure that the resources of social protection programs 
are directed to those most in need, so that resources are efficiently utilized. This paper 
discusses the effectiveness of targeting in social protection programs aimed to the 
improvement of children education outcomes. Following the introduction, challenges in 
relation to targeting are discussed. The evidence on policy and program evaluation since 2000 
and current status of key policies is then analyzed. Four country studies covering Colombia, 
Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia are presented with an aim to draw lessons out of these 
countries’ experiences. The final section concludes by summarizing and proposing key 
priorities for policies related to a post 2015 agenda.  
 
Main challenges in relation to targeting effectiveness in social protection programmes in 
education and evidence on approaches around 2000  
In line with the objectives, targeting social protection programs usually need two steps in its 
design. First, the program needs to identify who are the potential beneficiaries of the program 
or who is going to be reached (poor children, families at risk, orphans, indigenous, etc.). 
Second, the program needs to choose the ‘right’ targeting method to reach a group of 
population or households who qualify to be considered as the beneficiaries of the program or 
usually those who qualifies as poor.  There have been several methods of targeting discussed 
in the literature: Means testing or proxy means testing (where benefits are provided to those 
below a certain level of income or well-being), geographic (where programs are aimed people 
living in particular areas with certain characteristics such as poverty or marginality), 
categorical (where benefits are given to particular demographic groups such as children, 
orphans, indigenous groups, etc.), community-based assessment (where program assignment 
is decentralized to the leaders of local communities), and self-selection (mainly through the 
public works). 
Why does social protection program need targeting? Coady et al. (2004b; 2004a)discuss 
several reasons for targeting including maximizing poverty reduction and in general to 
contribute to increase social welfare as resources for poverty alleviation are usually limited. 
Thus, it is preferable to focus on the group who are most in need or to give the poor a higher 
amount of transfers rather than adopting a universal approach to give transfers to everyone.  
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There are issues and challenges both in the design and implementation of targeting social 
protection programs. What are the challenges and subsequently how do we measure that 
targeting is effective and reach the right beneficiaries? Relevant to this, Slater and Farrington 
(2009) have defined two terms:(i) targeting effectiveness which is defined as a measure of 
how far targeting approaches and mechanisms succeed in making transfers to intended 
beneficiaries and (ii) targeting efficiency which combines effectiveness with a measure of the 
costs of the implementation of the program. 
Morley and Coady (2003) summarize that in practice there are four challenges in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency. First, there has been criticism that social protection programs 
may not have been effective as the programs do not reach all the intended beneficiaries. 
Second, programs may not be cost effective (inefficient) due to high administrative costs and 
unnecessary operational efficiencies (for example corruption) during the implementation of 
the program. Third, the design of programs sometimes is too complex and uncoordinated. For 
this paper, we think the third challenge can be combined with the second one as it is 
reasonable to think that the more complex and uncoordinated the program is, the more costly 
it is.  Finally, they argue that as social protection programs are usually designed for short 
term perspective to reduce current poverty, these programs may not have yet focused much 
on the subsequent efforts to ensure the long term alleviation of poverty. Below, we discuss 
these challenges in more detail by mainly focusing on social protection programs that focus 
on children.  
Table 1 shows the two most common errors in targeting.  Both errors are trade-off each other, 
although programs usually focus on their efforts on minimizing the leakages (inclusion 
errors). 
Table 1. Targeting Errors 
 Welfare Status of Households 
 
 Poor Non-Poor 
Household excluded 
from program 
Exclusion error 
(undercoverage) 
Successful Exclusion 
Household included in 
program 
Successful Targeting Inclusion error 
(leakage) 
Source: Coady et al. (2004a) 
Coady et al. (2004a) construct a database covering 122 targeted anti-poverty programs that 
are found in 48 countries mostly in low and middle-income countries during 1985-2003. 
Although currently, some of the programs have been inactive, we decide to utilise this 
database to draw relevant lessons particularly because based on our knowledge, this is the 
most extensive database which links the targeting methods with a summary of targeting 
performance indicator (please see the Appendix for the methodology of this database 
construction). There are different ranges of programs included in this database (CCT, food 
aid, child allowance etc.) that focus on children. Using this database, on average, Coady et al. 
(2004a) find that the median targeting performance is 1.25 which means that the median 
program transfers 25 % more to poor individuals through the targeting program. 
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Nevertheless, there are variations in terms of targeting performance across social protection 
programs and across different countries as each of the targeting mechanisms have its own 
strengths and weaknesses. We extend Coady et al. (2004) analysis and focus on programs that 
are child sensitive or those which focus on the education for children (including the CCT and 
food aid programs). 25 programs are identified and their targeting performances are ranked. 
Yemen with the Social Welfare Fund Cash had the highest targeting performance at 2.15 
while in contrast; Bulgaria Child/family cash allowance had the lowest targeting performance 
at 0.95. Most of the programs do not use only a single targeting method. For example, the 
Social Welfare Fund Cash in Yemen actually applied 4 different targeting methods in 
addition to targeting the program to children. 
Appropriate combinations of methods can provide complementarities, with the different 
strengths effectively offsetting the weaknesses. Table 2 examines the preliminary association 
between numbers of targeting methods used and the median of targeting performance 
respectively. Table 2 shows that using up to 3 types of targeting methods, the more targeting 
methods used, the median of targeting performance increases which indicates a mixture of 
targeting methods tend to improve targeting performance. Interestingly our observations 
indicate that applying too many targeting methods does not necessarily mean improving 
targeting performance as in the case of applying 4+ targeting methods.  This may indicate 
when there are 4 or more targeting methods applied, the targeting in practice have become 
very complex that benefits of having such complexities may be diminishing. Excluding 
Yemen and Chile (with school feeding) which have a targeting performance around 2 or 
more, other programs in this group are the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) education subsidy in 
Indonesia, GAPVU cash transfers in Mozambique, Child allowance program in Uzbekistan, 
SGF food transfers in Vietnam and Food for education in Bangladesh. All have targeting 
performances in the range between 1.05-1.44. Four out of seven programs which are in 4+ 
category have adopted community targeting method in combination to the other methods (and 
surprisingly community targeting method is not used in the other programs which use less 
than 4 targeting methods). More research is required to uncover whether there are challenges 
that we should be aware when combining many targeting methods with another one of the 
community targeting.   
 
Table 2.Numbers of targeting methods and targeting performance across child sensitive 
program 
Number of targeting approach Median of targeting performance 
4+ 1.35 
3 1.8 
2 1.475 
1 1.13 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Coady et al. (2004b) 
We look further on the combination between programs targeted to children which used any 
other type of targeting and examine both median and average value of targeting performance. 
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Table 3 shows that those programs which used geographic targeting as one of the targeting 
methods achieve the highest targeting performance followed by programs which use proxy 
means testing which is not surprising as both are the most common targeting methods 
adapted by social protection programs.  All targeting methods were found to be progressive 
as the targeting performance values are greater than 1. 
 
Table 3. Type of targeting method and targeting performance across child sensitive 
program 
Targeting Method Median targeting 
performance 
Average targeting 
performance 
N 
Means testing 1.35 1.56 7 
Proxy means testing 1.56 1.52 5 
Community 
assessment 
1.40 1.49 4 
Geographic 1.63 1.69 11 
Age – Elderly 1.14 1.36 4 
Other  1.45 1.60 10 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Coady et al. (2004b).  The list includes programs that use single targeting 
method or multiple targeting methods. 
 
Most of the programs discussed above target children to either enroll or keep them to study at 
school in order to reduce the number of children dropping out from school or target children 
who are at risk to be out of school if the social protection is not given. Interestingly, based on 
our knowledge, there have been only few programs which have a particular focus to include 
the drop-outs children to bring them back to school. Among these limited programs, 
Reaching-Out-of School Children program (ROSC) in Bangladesh, started in 2004, has 
targeted to children who have not had opportunity to attend primary school in the remote 
areas (hard to reach students) and dropouts from primary school (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). 
The intervention is considered as unusual with a classroom and a teacher in each ROSC 
school (Dang et al. 2011). This program has spent efforts to reduce the number of out-of 
school children in Bangladesh by improving access, quality and efficiency of primary 
education. Despite of the differences in the focus of type of children targeted, the ROSC 
program has applied geographic targeting, so quite similar targeting method as on the other 
types of social protection programs, although this may have a stronger focus on the remote 
areas where many of out of school children are located (UNICEF, 2014). Reaching-Out-of-
School Children has covered around half of million children. Dang et al. (2011) from their 
impact evaluation have found that: ROSC schools have increased the likelihood of school 
enrollment modestly, between 9 and 18 % for children in the two age cohorts 6-8 and 6-10 
respectively. Another set of programs that reach out-of-school children, particularly in Asia 
and Latin America, are those related to non-formal education programs such as flexible 
learning models or accelerated learning programs, particularly for adolescents (UNICEF, 
2014).  While most of the targeting of these programs is also geographic (targeting either 
deprived areas in cities or remote areas), there is also the need for updated information 
systems that can allow for the identification of out-of-school children or children at high risk 
of dropping out. 
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While we have discussed that targeting is applied to improve effectiveness of social programs 
to reach the beneficiaries better, somehow targeting may not always mean that targeted 
programs are more costs-effective compared with universal programs (Dutrey, 2007). There 
are various costs associated with the social protection programs which not only cover direct 
administrative costs or private costs but also indirect costs such as political (e.g. targeting 
criteria can be manipulated for personal gain and interest as we show for the case of  
Colombia at the initial phase of implementation of  the program Familias en Acción), social 
costs (for example stigma attached to the beneficiaries) and other costs on whom the 
beneficiaries maybe the bearer of these costs. These costs include high transportation (long 
distance travel) and opportunity costs for those who live in rural and remote areas to register 
or to access the program (for example in the case of the application of PRAF- Honduras and 
ODC-Slovenia). Moreover, the size of transfer sometimes is also considered too low when 
compared with the costs  (see for example in case of PRAF-Honduras, Child Allowance-
Romania and RPS Nicaragua) or as what experienced by programs in the developing 
countries, the program may not be efficient due corruption during the implementation of the 
program.   
Drawing examples of CCT programs recorded at Grosh et al. (2008), Table A1. in the 
Appendix shows estimations of administrative costs as share of the total cost and find that 
costs range from only 4 % for Primary Education Stipend Program adapted in Bangladesh 
(which combined geographic and community-based targeting) to 13 % for Path in Jamaica 
(which adapted proxy means testing which mainly cover the administration costs of the 
program). Literature suggested that either means tested or proxy means tested to be relatively 
more costly and more difficult to administer than any other types of targeting (Grosh et al., 
2008). Further, when the program adapts more than one type of targeting, or when the 
programs are in fact too complex and uncoordinated, the program is also more costly.   
However, as we showed earlier, more than one type of targeting method may help to increase 
targeting effectiveness, suggesting a trade-off between complexity and effectiveness.  As we 
show later, a high proportion of programs targeted to children, as is the case of Colombia, 
Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, use a combination of targeting methods.  
Finally, as we show in the cases bellow, other challenges are related non-awareness of the 
eligible beneficiaries of the programs. It is interesting to observe that the positive education 
outcomes of the programs may not depend on the size of the contribution of the 
administrative costs to the total costs as indicated in Table A1. Further research is warranted 
to examine this issue. Another observation that can be drawn from this table is that, 
consistent with previous research (Behrman & Parker, 2014; Saavedra & García, 2013), the 
lower the baseline enrollment is the higher the impact of the educational outcomes (in terms 
of the percentage points of the impact).   
While the discussion above cover issues/challenges more from the demand side, there have 
been issues related from supply side that are considered as important (Vadapalli, 2009). Some 
of these issues will be discussed later in more detailed in the case studies. First, the issue of 
administrative or  institutional capacity for example, the infrastructure that can support the 
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program coverage may not be always available in all areas especially in remote areas where 
potentially many eligible program beneficiaries are located as in the case of Indonesia (where 
the issue of regional disparity in terms of infrastructure availability is crucial and may have 
impacted the intake of the program). Further, the availability of integrated data that can 
improve the targeting and strengthen the institutional capacity is also important. Colombia 
has spent efforts to address this challenge by improving its database SISBEN similarly with 
Brazil with its CadUnico and Indonesia with the PPLS where the databases include non-
income variables which are linked with capabilities and well-being. 
Second, status of the country including its political stability is also important. Coady et al. 
(2004a) find that countries with better capacity for program implementation as measured by 
GDP per capita may do better at directing benefits towards poorer members of the 
population. Similarly the countries which have stronger voices tend to perform better. As in 
the case of South Africa where the voice of civil society is strong, many reforms of the social 
protection program in this country have been initiated by this movement. Further, 
interestingly, targeting tends to perform better in countries where inequality is more obvious 
and consequently differences in economic wellbeing are easier to identify. As in the case of 
Indonesia, Sumarto and Bazzi (2011) argue that there have been difficulty of targeting the 
poor and near poor since inequality in Indonesia has been relatively low. While in contrast, 
Samson et al. (2006) have discussed that the most effective income transfer programs are 
located in countries which have high income inequality such as Brazil and South Africa.  
Further, the issue of poor communication of the program is also a challenge as in the case of 
Indonesia, not all potential beneficiaries are aware on the availability and information in 
regard to the social protection program, which may lead to exclusion errors..  
 
Evidence on policy and programme evolution since 2000 and current status of key 
policies and programmes by targeting approach and country group  
Education interventions can be classified in two main categories: demand and supply 
interventions (Krishnaratne, White, & Carpenter, 2013).  This paper focuses on the former. In 
particular, programs on social protection that are aimed to increase the demand and access to 
schooling, and that are usually embedded in social safety nets (SSNs)3.  Most of these 
programs are embedded in social safety nets as part of the social protection system.  
Following the typology proposed by Krishnaratne (2013) demand-side school interventions 
can be divided into:  
• Reducing costs: cash transfers (both conditioned and unconditioned), school fees 
subsidies, tuition/fee waivers, or scholarships and vouchers.  
• Increasing preparedness: early childhood development, health interventions (such as 
deworming or immunization) and nutrition (school feeding, take home rations). 
                                                          
3 “Social safety nets (SSNs) are noncontributory programs that target the poor and vulnerable and are designed 
to reduce poverty and inequality, enable better human capital investments, improve social risk management, and 
offer social protection" (IEG, 2011). So the policies covered in this paper are a subset of wider policies, such as 
school expansion, infrastructure, education quality interventions, and labor market interventions, etc.). 
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There is evidence from rigorous impact evaluations that many of these demand-side 
interventions have positive effects on enrollment and attendance.  A systematic review of 
social safety nets from the World Bank shows that most of these programs (22 out of 25 
programs) have a positive impact on enrollment and attendance and on average the impacts 
are larger for secondary than primary school (IEG, 2011). They also show that most effective 
interventions in improving school enrollment and attendance are Conditional Cash Transfers 
(CCTs), food aid (both school feeding and take-home rations programs) and education fee 
waiver programs, which are programs that have these education outcomes as part of their 
requirements. Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) also show positive effects on enrollment 
and attendance, although the size of the effects are smaller when compared to programs 
where conditions are monitored and enforced (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & Woolcock, 2013).  In 
terms of the effectiveness of these programs on learning outcomes, the evidence is mixed 
(Behrman, Parker, & Todd, 2014; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Krishnaratne et al., 2013).  
There is some evidence that social protection programs have an effect on attainment (number 
of years of education) and graduation rates, but it comes from very few impact evaluations 
and impacts are relatively small. Also, effectiveness on performance or learning outcomes is 
relatively small, suggesting the needing for complementing demand-side interventions with 
supply-side components that guarantee quality of education for those who enroll and attend. 
In order to have a picture of the evolution and characteristics of social protection programs 
aimed to increase school enrollment, we used reviews that look at CCTs (Saavedra & García, 
2013), UCTs (Baird et al., 2013) and safety net programs (Bouillon & Tejerina, 2007; IEG, 
2011; ILO, 2010) and websites from World Bank (an updated version of information 
provided from the authors at Fiszbein & Schady (2009))4 and Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)5 that have up to date information on CCT 
programs.  Table A.2 (in appendix) presents the aggregated information from these sources in 
terms of the year when the program started, the type of program, targeting criteria and 
method6.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 http://go.worldbank.org/BWUC1CMXM0 
5 http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/  
6 It is important to note that most of these data come from reviews that include information from reports or 
articles on impact evaluations.  Therefore, some programs may be left out because are not included in these 
reviews. 
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Table 4. Summary of program characteristics and targeting mechanisms   
 
Number of 
programs 
% 
(among 
total) 
% of programs with 
available data on the 
respective characteristic 
Type of program    
  Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 77 52.7% 52.7% 
  Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) 14 9.6% 9.6% 
  CCT/UCT 8 5.5% 5.5% 
  Food Aid (school feeding or take-home rations) 25 17.1% 17.1% 
  Fee waivers  18 12.3% 12.3% 
  Family or child allowances 4 2.7% 2.7% 
Total of programs 146 
  
    Start year 
     Before 2000 32 21.9% 24.6% 
  Between 2001 and 2005 48 32.9% 36.9% 
  Between 2006 and 2010 42 28.8% 32.3% 
  2011 and after 8 5.5% 6.2% 
  Data not available 16 11.0% 
 Targeting mechanism 
   Geographic and Means tested or PMT 40 27.4% 37.0% 
Means or Proxy Means Tested (PMT) 31 21.2% 28.7% 
Geographic 8 5.5% 7.4% 
Categorical and Means tested or PMT 7 4.8% 6.5% 
Community-based 3 2.1% 2.8% 
Categorical 5 3.4% 4.6% 
Geographic, Community-based and Means tested 
or PMT 5 3.4% 4.6% 
Community-based and Means tested or PMT 2 1.4% 1.9% 
Geographic and Categorical 1 0.7% 0.9% 
Geographic and Community-based 2 1.4% 1.9% 
Geographic, Categoric and Means tested or PMT 1 0.7% 0.9% 
Universal 2 1.4% 1.9% 
Data not available 38 26.0% 
 Age or grade level targeting 
     Both Primary and Secondary 52 35.6% 55.3% 
  Primary 23 15.8% 24.5% 
  Secondary 19 13.0% 20.2% 
  Data not available 52 35.6%  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Baird et al. (2013), Bouillon & Tejerina (2007), IEG (2011), ILO (2010), 
Saavedra & García (2013), World Bank CCTs database (updated version of  Fiszbein & Schady  (2009) at 
go.worldbank.org) and ECLAC database (dds.cepal.org/bdptc).  See detailed aggregated information in Table 
A.2 in Appendix. 
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The bulk of social protection programs targeted to children started after 2000.  Before 2000, 
we found 32 programs, mostly in Latin America (21) and Asia (7) and only 3 in Africa. 
These programs were mostly CCTs (9), food aid programs (8) and fee waivers (7).  One 
country (Brazil) appears with 4 different programs in the form of CCTs or fee waivers, which 
after 2000 will become one single CCT national program (as it is described later). 
The introduction of social protection programs is influenced by a combination of many 
factors including as a response to shocks (such as global/macroeconomic shocks or economic 
crisis) as in the case of Indonesia and Colombia, as an impact of policy changes,  driven by 
donor agencies (as in the case of Indonesia and Colombia as well) and to some extent because 
of the movement of civil society such as in the case of South Africa. This will be discussed in 
more details later in four country studies covering Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and 
Indonesia.  
After 2000, there is clear a boom of social protection programs targeted to children and with 
education outcomes as objectives.  As it is shown in Table 4, 44 programs (33% of programs 
with available data) started between 2001 and 2005, 42 programs (29%) between 2006 and 
2010, and 8 started after 2010.  This increase is mainly driven by CCT programs, which are 
clearly the main type of social protection program targeted to school aged children in the 
developing world.  Also, as it is shown in Figure 1, it is clear that the boom in Latin America 
occurred mostly between 2001 and 2005, and that there is a shift towards Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
Figure 1. Number of social protection programs aimed at improving schooling outcomes 
by region and year of program starting   
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In terms of types of programs, over half (53%) of programs are CCTs and another 15% are 
either are either UCTs or a combination of CCTs/UCTs7.  The other two type of programs 
that are important in terms of number of programs found are food aid programs (including 
school feeding and take-home rations) which represent 17%, and fee waivers which represent 
12%.  It is important to highlight that although there is a much higher number of studies 
describing impact evaluation results from CCT/UCT programs than from food programs, as 
mentioned earlier, the evidence available shows that school feeding and take-home rations do 
increase school enrollment and attendance (Behrman et al., 2014). 
Most of these programs have as targeting criteria school aged children who are vulnerable for 
some reason: living under extreme poverty conditions (such as Program Keluarga Harapan 
in Indonesia or PATH in Jamaica), living in remote or rural areas (such as the National 
School Meals Program in Lao or Comunidades Solidarias Rurales in El Salvador), or 
belonging to a caste (ApniBeti Apna Dhan in India) or indigenous group (Familias en Acción 
in Colombia) or orphans (such as cash programs in Kenya and Burkina Faso). Other countries 
use a more general criteria of vulnerability and target families or children “at social risk” 
(Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011) in terms of risk of malnutrition of children, unemployment or 
labor market constraints  of adults in the household (e.g. Families for Social Inclusion in 
Argentina). In terms of age or school level, targeted ages or grades vary: 55% of social 
protection programs for which information is available target explicitly to both primary and 
secondary-aged children, while 24% target specifically to primary-aged children only and 
20% to secondary-aged children only. 
Targeting mechanisms usually are a combination of more than one criterion. In Latin 
America, as we show later for the cases of Brazil and Colombia, the most common 
mechanism in early stages of CCTs was a two-stage process where first there is geographic 
targeting (to poorest areas or small/rural areas) and then there is stage of  household targeting 
(means or proxy means tested) among households with school-aged children within the 
targeted areas (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011).  Currently, many countries (Colombia, Mexico, 
Brazil) have expanded the coverage of CCT programs and therefore targeting is primarily 
means tested (proxy means). When looking at the entire groups of programs (Table 4) we 
find that the most common mechanism is the combination of geographic and means testing 
(37 % of cases), followed by means or proxy means tested programs (28.7%).  Geographic 
mechanisms (either alone or in combination with means tested, categorical or community-
based targeting) are used in 53% of cases. 
Within the mechanisms of geographic targeting, identification of geographic areas are usually 
done by poverty, using indicators such as income poverty (e.g. Mexico in urban areas), 
Unmet Basic Needs (e.g Paraguay or Mexico in rural areas), Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(e.g. Colombia), or ii) population size (which has a high correlation with vulnerability or 
poverty – this was the case in the early version of Familias en Acción in Colombia). 
                                                          
7 In some cases, cash transfer programs are unconditioned but households think that are conditioned or they are 
conditioned but conditions are not verified.  In such cases, programs classify as CCT/UCT 
12 
 
When the criterion of targeting is poverty, most countries use proxy means rather than 
income poverty in order to identify beneficiaries.  This can be explained for two main 
reasons: first, measuring income is very costly.  It requires very detailed data for all income 
sources in the households. In the context of developing countries where informal labor is so 
common, income flows are very variable over time, changing even on a daily basis, therefore 
reporting accurate amounts of income for income poverty calculations become very difficult 
and errors can increase, as it was the case in Colombia in the first phase of social protection 
targeting where income was used as one of the variables for targeting.  Second, self-reported 
income for targeting purposes may be inaccurate because families tend to underreport income 
if they know that will be eligible for a program if their income is under certain threshold (as it 
happened in Brazil before verification checks were implemented).  Also, using variables such 
as assets or education capture more structural poverty  whereas using only income may 
capture short-term income shocks (Ribas, Veras, & Issamu, 2008).   
Finally, it is important to underscore that means or proxy means targeting requires high-
quality data in order to correctly identify potential beneficiaries of social programs.  For 
proxy means tested mechanisms countries use data on household characteristics, such as 
dwelling conditions, access to public services such as water and sanitation, and characteristics 
of household members such as age and education, that can be used to predict poverty 
conditions.  Such indicators require detailed data that is collected at the household level.  
Examples of these information systems are CAS in Chile (Irarrázabal, 2004), and SISBEN in 
Colombia and CadUnico in Brazil (as described below).   
 
Case studies: policy and programme evolution in Colombia, Brazil, Indonesia and 
South Africa 
Colombia  
The CCT Familias en Acción Program (FAP) was created in 2001, as a response to an 
economic crisis that hit Colombia in the late 1990s.  The program was designed by the 
Colombian government with support from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank as part of a reform of the social protection system8 (Báez & Camacho, 
2011),  following the experience of Brazil with Bolsa Escola (at that time) and Mexico with 
Oportunidades. Since its origin, the program had a dual objective: 1) to offer a safety net that 
can alleviate poverty and protect poor households from economic shocks, and 2) to promote 
human capital development in the long run. 
As other CCTs, the Colombian program offers a monetary transfer (nutrition subsidy) to poor 
families with children conditional on health check-ups for children under 7 years old, and a 
monetary transfer (education subsidy) conditional on school enrollment and 80% attendance 
for school-age children. The implementation of the program was accompanied by a quasi-
                                                          
8 At the initial phases of the program, there was a strong support from international agencies.  After the results 
of (positive) impact evaluations, the decision was to expand the program and, actually, FAP was enacted as a 
permanent program by law and its funding was taken up by the central government. 
13 
 
experimental impact evaluation.  Results reported by Attanasio et al (2010) show that FAP 
implemented in small towns had a positive impact on school enrollment, particularly among 
adolescents (6.6 percentage points  in rural areas and 4.7 percentage points in urban areas).  
Impacts on enrollment were smaller for primary school (2.8 percentage points in rural areas 
and 1.4 percentage points in urban areas).  However, this is a noticeable impact given that 
primary enrollment rates in Colombia are relatively high (between 91% and 96% at the time 
of the evaluation as discussed in(Attanasio et al., 2010).   FAP also had a large and positive 
effect on school attendance, particularly among secondary school.  The program increased 
attendance by 17.5 percentage points for rural adolescents and 7.8 percentage points for 
adolescents in urban areas.  For children aged 8-11 years old, FAP produced an increase of 
3.4 and 6.1 percentage points in urban and rural areas respectively (Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación, 2006).  As per of long term impacts: After 9 years of implementation, Baez 
and Camacho (Báez & Camacho, 2011) show that FAP increased the probability of high 
school graduation, and that the effects are larger for girls and for those living in rural areas.  
However, as with other CCT programs, there is little evidence on learning.  Few studies show 
that FAP has very small (or none) impacts on test scores (Báez & Camacho, 2011; García & 
Hill, 2010).  
FAP has evolved both in terms of program design (age cutoffs for nutrition and education 
subsidies, and transfer amounts) and target population.  Three main phases can be identified.  
The first phase started in 2001 and the program was targeted to poor families with children 
living in small municipalities (with less than 100,000), that had a bank (so that payments 
could be made), that had some basic infrastructure so that families were able to meet 
requirements, and  where local officials were interested in program participation and had sent 
the documentation required by the national government (Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, 2006). In this phase, the amount of the education subsidy varied by whether the 
child was enrolled in primary school (approximately US$6) or secondary school 
(approximately US$12).   An important change that happened during this phase in terms of 
targeting was the introduction of categorical criteria in order to include two vulnerable groups 
of the population (Acción Social, 2008; Velásquez et al, 2012): families displaced from the 
internal conflict (included in 2004 as eligible) and families from indigenous communities 
(included in 2007 as eligible).    
In 2007 the government started a second phase of expansion of FAP to small municipalities 
that not were covered in phase 1 but also to families living in cities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants and large cities. An important change in the design of the program during this 
phase was the elimination of the education subsidy to families with children in primary 
school living in large urban areas.  This decision was made as a result of the impact 
evaluation of phase 1, that showed positive effects of the FAP on school enrollment and 
attendance in secondary school both in urban and rural areas, small effects in primary school 
enrollment in rural areas, and no effects on primary school in urban areas (Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación, 2008; Núñez et al., 2011).  However, as a compensation for children 
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under this age group, the monetary amount of the nutrition subsidy was increased9.   Another 
change in the design of the program in this phase was the introduction of differential transfer 
amounts by grade level in secondary school, so that as children progress from one grade level 
to the next, they can receive a higher amount and have higher incentives for high school 
graduation.   
The last phase (and current version of the program) started in 2012 and corresponds to 
adjustments to reduce regional inequalities, but keeping the design features that have proved 
success. The program name was slightly changed to Más Familias en Acción (“More 
Families in Action”), giving the message that the program will stay and be strengthen.  An 
important change is that families living in poorer areas receive higher subsidy amounts10.  
More important, and strongly related to primary schooling11, two main changes occurred: 1) 
all school-aged children receive an education subsidy12 and the subsidy amount is 
incremental with grades (DPS, 2013b); and 2) there is an education subsidy for children aged 
5 years old, who receive an education subsidy if enrolled in pre-k. This new subsidy is very 
relevant in the Colombian context because about 8% of children dropout during the first two 
grades of primary and one of the risk factors is not having pre-k (García, Fernández, & 
Sánchez, 2010).  
In sum, in all but phase one (which had a geographic targeting before individual level 
targeting) targeting criteria is either poverty/vulnerability status or belonging to a specific 
group such as displaced or indigenous.  Displaced families and those belonging to indigenous 
populations are identified from certified national registries13.  Poor families are identified 
with a proxy-means test that incorporates several household characteristics that are related to 
poverty or well-being.  This information is collected by municipal authorities and then 
consolidated at the national level by the National Department of Planning (NDP) through an 
information system called SISBEN (information system for identification of potential 
beneficiaries), that has data on all potential beneficiaries.  Data collection is concentrated in 
areas of high concentration of poverty and is intended to have a census of all potential 
beneficiaries. NDP runs an algorithm to compute a score (also called SISBEN score) and 
                                                          
9 The impact evaluation of this phase shows that there were no detrimental effects on school enrollment for 
children under 11 and that actually there was a positive effect on enrollment in all cities but Bogota (the capital 
city), where primary enrollment rates are high (Nuñez et al., 2009).  There are two main explanations to this 
result: families of these children are still receiving a monetary transfer for nutrition, and also, if they have older 
siblings, the family is receiving the education subsidy for those children.  
10 Four regions where defined depending on the Multidimensional Poverty Index.  Families living in the poorest 
regions receive larger subsidies.  
11 Other changes took place that are more related to secondary schooling such as increase in age of eligibility for 
youth enrolled in the two last years of secondary school, so that they can finish high school, and subsidies to 
incentivize higher education. 
12 The only exception is Bogota, where primary enrollment is close to universal and therefor children in grades 1 
to 5 receive no education subsidy.  
13 For displaced population there is a special registry, where people are certified by the government as victims of 
the internal conflict and had to migrate internally.  For indigenous communities there is an indigenous census 
that is certified by the community (Robles, 2010). 
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provides this information to the agency that runs FAP14, who determines eligibility based on 
the SISBEN scores and returns the list of eligible families to municipalities.   
The targeting information system was created by law as an instrument to increase efficiency 
in social spending and target services to those most in need.  Since its inception in 1994, there 
had been three versions of SISBEN, always aiming at increasing targeting efficiency.  The 
first version (1994-2003) was a proxy-means test that included income information. This 
version was subject to manipulation at the local level, particularly close to elections. 
Camacho y Conover (2009) show that there were manual changes of the scores at the 
municipal level and that one of the major changes occurred with income data (which was 
easier to manipulate and not verified).  The second version of SISBEN excluded income as a 
variable to determine eligibility and, instead, incorporated a variable of socioeconomic strata 
(associated with the type of dwelling and neighborhood).  However, this variable was also 
manipulated and led to large inclusion errors, particularly at time of local elections, when 
incumbent politicians managed to lower scores to make more people eligible to the program 
and gain more votes15 (Camacho, 2010).  Therefore, the last version of SISBEN excluded this 
variable and includes a more comprehensive set of variables associated not only with income 
but also with capabilities and well-being. Also, a more complicated algorithm was designed 
to minimize manipulation and increase targeting efficiency (Flórez, Espinosa, & Sánchez, 
2008).  
Overall, coverage of FAP went from 0.9% of Colombian population in 2001 to 25.3% in 
2010 (Paes-Sousa, Regalia, & Stampini, 2013).  As a proportion of eligible families, FAP’s 
coverage remained stable between 2009 and 2012, with about 65% of eligible families 
receiving the program (DPS, 2013a)), which is a relatively high coverage rate compared to 
other CCT programs.  In contrast, inclusion errors are large: Stampini & Tornarolli (2012) 
show that 71.4% of beneficiaries have an income above 2.5USD, and 49.4% of beneficiaries 
have an income above 4USD.  It is difficult to determine how much of the inclusion error rate 
is due to the fact that families may have moved out of poverty.  However, these rates are very 
high compared to other countries with CCT programs (for instance, there are close to 20 
percentage points larger than Brazil – see Figure 2).  It is expected that with the new version 
of SISBEN, that purposefully tried to minimize inclusion errors and increase coverage, these 
errors will start to decrease. 
One characteristic of FAP’s implementation is that program registration occurs in certain 
windows of time (is not permanent, like in other cases like Brazil).  Therefore, those eligible 
families who do not register on those periods of time (for example those who may live in 
remote areas or have little access to information) stay excluded from the program and have to 
wait until the next round of registration.  Recently, the Colombian government made 
additional efforts to increase coverage.  First, greater efforts were made at the local level to 
announce the program so that eligible families come to register. Also, SISBEN data was 
                                                          
14 National Department for Social Prosperity (DPS) 
15 The study does not provide evidence on what proportion of those for which scores were lowered, were in 
fact poor or really in need of the program.  Therefore it is not possible to estimate the size of the inclusion 
error as a consequence of the manipulation. 
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collected on a larger group of the population in order to increase potential beneficiaries. It is 
expected that in the short run these efforts will translate in further reductions of exclusion 
errors.   
 
Brazil  
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is one of the largest CCT programs among developing countries 
(Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012). The program was created in 2003 and corresponds to the merge 
of five social assistance  programs that were created in the late 1990s and early 2000: Bolsa 
Escola (a CCT program targeted to poor families with children aged 5 to 15 years old 
conditioned on school attendance and enrollment),  Bolsa Alimentação (a cash (voucher) 
transfer program targeted to poor families with children under 7 years old conditioned  health 
checkups for pregnant woman and children), Auxílio Gas (cash transfer to compensate for 
cooking gas prices), Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, PETI (a CCT program 
conditioned on school attendance and targeted to children at high risk of child labor), and 
Cartão Alimentação as part of Fome Zero (a cash transfer to very poor families in order to 
promote food consumption and prevent hunger) (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & de la Bièrre, 
2007; Soares, Perez-Ribas, & Veras, 2010).  Since its inception, PBF had a strong support 
from the World Bank both with financial support and technical assistance.  During the initial 
years of implementation (2003-2006), close to 25% of the program was funded by loans from 
World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank.  Currently the World Bank still 
provides technical assistance but the central government makes most of the efforts to 
guarantee funding to the program operation (IEG, 2013b). 
Overall, Bolsa Familia has 3 main target populations: 1) poor families with children under 6 
and pregnant women, who receive a cash transfer conditioned on attaining prenatal and 
postnatal checkups and keeping vaccination complete, 2) poor families with children between 
6 and 17 years old, who receive a cash transfer conditioned on children and adolescents’ 
school enrollment and attendance; and 3) very poor families, regardless of household 
composition.  It is important to note that adolescents aged 16 and 17 were not incorporated as 
part of the target group until 2008 (IEG, 2013a). 
The implementation of Bolsa Familia has not been accompanied by an experimental impact 
evaluation (such as Progresa in Mexico).  However, there are few studies that use 
econometric techniques to estimate the effects of the program.   Glewwe & Kassouf (2012) 
find that Bolsa Escola / Familia had a positive impact on school enrollment both in primary 
(2.6 percentage points ) and lower secondary school  (1.8 percentage points).   (Glewwe & 
Kassouf, 2012).  Also, a study by Janvry et al (2006) find that Bolsa Familia reduced dropout 
rates by  7.8 percentage points and that the impact was equally large for primary and 
secondary school. (De Janvry et al., 2006) More importantly, impacts were larger for older 
students who attend school at night (night shift).   
The earlier version of CCT (Bolsa Escola) had high levels of exclusion errors: in one of the 
states (Recife) the only 2% of poor families were covered by the program (Cardoso & Souza, 
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2004).  This is why one of the objectives of unifying several social protection programs into 
Bolsa Familia was to improve the targeting mechanisms and make a more efficient use of 
resources (Lindert et al., 2007).  In fact, the Brazilian government received technical 
assistance from the World Bank to improve targeting and monitoring systems and was able to 
expand and reach a high proportion of poor households.  By 2010, targeting goals were 
achieved, and even surpassed: 68% of benefits went to the poorest quintile (vs a goal of 40%) 
and 90% went to the poorest 2 quintiles (IEG, 2013a)16.  If we consider the poorest tail of the 
distribution, however, only 55% of those with incomes below 2.5 dollars-a-day receive the 
program (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012).  While it looks a large exclusion error (45% of those 
below that income do not receive the program), it is the smallest for Latin American countries 
(as shown in Figure 2).  
The program is targeted using both geographic and means-tested mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms are implemented in three stages and the responsibilities are shared between the 
central government and the municipalities: first, the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) 
determines quotas of eligible families for different municipalities according to their predicted 
level of poverty, and then municipalities collect data on households’ income and 
demographic composition.  Finally, municipalities send this information back to the central 
government, who decides final eligibility and makes the payments of cash subsides (Soares et 
al., 2010). 
One of the key elements for the implementation of the targeting procedures of Bolsa Familia 
was the setup of a unified information system (CadUnico) that allows gathering and keeping 
information on potential beneficiaries and deciding program eligibility.  The registry forms 
that are used to collect the data for CadUnico are designed by the central government and 
then distributed to municipalities to do the data collection.  While this discretionality in 
municipalities may have some problems (as discussed below), research has shown that this 
information system explains a large proportion (40%) of Bolsa Familia’s targeting 
performance (Barros, 2008), cited in Soares et al. 2010).  
Another important change in the targeting procedures is verification of income data.  Before 
the consolidation of Bolsa Familia, municipalities were in charge not only of income data 
collection but also of determining program eligibility.  This may be problematic because 
there is variation across municipalities in the way they collect these data: some have families 
declare their income and record this data without verification; others have social workers who 
verify earnings information or collect data on expenditures to verify actual income 
information.  This means, that in the absence of validation check, the use of self-declared 
income data may produce high levels of inclusion errors because individuals may tend to 
underreport income in order to be eligible. De Janvry et al. (2006) show that for Bolsa 
Escola, the program had significantly larger impact on reducing school dropout when 
municipalities had a verification procedure of income data as part of the targeting process.  
                                                          
16 This does not necessarily mean an exclusion error of 10% because some households in the poorest 2 quintiles may not 
be eligible by the definition of income poverty (the income poverty threshold is lower than the mean income for those in 
the second quintile, thus many of those at the second quintile are near poor but not poor) 
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After the unification of social protection programs into Bolsa Familia, there is cross-checking 
of income data at the central level, and it is the MDS (not the municipalities) who decides 
final eligibility.  While not perfect17, this verification of data is an improvement from the 
previous system because diminished incentives to underreport income and reduced the risk of 
clientelism at the local level (Lindert et al., 2007).   
Despite its success, the targeting system of Bolsa Familia has room for improvement, 
particularly in reducing inclusion errors.  Soares et al. (2010) report that 49% of beneficiaries 
are not eligible. One possible explanation of this high rate, as the authors explain, is income 
volatility: those “not eligible” are not necessarily non-poor, but happen to have an income 
level slightly above the eligibility cut-off at the time of data collection.  This poses as 
challenge in terms the type of data that should be collected for targeting: if the objective is to 
reach vulnerable families who are at high risk of becoming poor in a given month, then 
income may not be the best targeting indicator, but rather variables that give more 
information on vulnerability such as financial and human assets.  
Another challenge of the current targeting system is the use of quotas.  These are set on 
estimations on poverty rates at municipality level, but not on actual poverty rates.  The 
estimations are based on survey data that are representative at the state but not at the 
municipal level, which means that estimates of local poverty are not precise (Soares, 2010).  
Therefore, some municipalities may get as quota less beneficiaries than the actual number of 
poor families (having the higher risk of exclusion errors), or more beneficiaries than the 
actual number of poor families (having a higher risk of inclusion errors if income data 
crosschecks of income data are not accurate).   
Finally, decentralization in data collection is still a challenge for an optimal implementation 
of a targeting system: municipalities take decisions on how, when and where to collect data 
and this may have implications for targeting performance. For instance, if families are 
registered at schools or churches rather than at their homes, or if teachers of health workers 
rather than public officials collect the data, may have an impact on program performance  
because registration at public spaces allows higher social control and registration by 
community members is associated with higher transparency (De Janvry et al., 2006).   It is 
possible that more standardization on these procedures across municipalities may lead to 
better improvement of targeting effectiveness in Brazil.   
 
Indonesia  
Similarly as in the case of Colombia, the first social protection program for Indonesia was 
launched to mitigate the adverse impact of  economic and financial economic crisis in 
1997/1998. This program was called the Social Safety Net program (JPS) which included 
                                                          
17 Some authors (Veras, Perez, & Guerreiro, 2010) call this a “semi-verification” process because only formal 
worker status and earnings are checked .  Given that there is a high level of informal employment, earnings for 
informal workers cannot be verified.  However, other multidimensional indicators are also used in the cross-
checking process (Lindert et al., 2007). 
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several education subsidy programs such as the scholarship programs (BKM/Bantuan Khusus 
Murid) for students not only in the primary but also secondary schools and blocks grants for 
schools (World Bank, 2011). This SSN program had strong financial supports particularly 
from the international donor agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
In 2005/2006, Indonesia adopted the Unconditional Cash Transfer (Bantuan Langsung Tunai) 
program as the compensation towards the poor to reduce the impact of the increasing global 
fuel price and subsequently in Indonesia which had an impact on the fuel subsidy withdrawal. 
The Unconditional Cash Transfer was provided again in 2008/09 to protect vulnerable 
households from further fuel price increase and the effects of the global financial crises. So, 
the role of global shock in the case of the constructions of the SSN and Unconditional Cash 
Transfer as social protection programs which responded to global shocks in Indonesia was 
crucial, supported  by donor agencies. 
The introduction of the Hopeful Family Program (Program Keluarga Harapan/PKH) in 
Indonesia was initially also largely donor driven and strongly advocated by the World Bank. 
The idea of having a kind of CCT program came up in early 2005 as an alternative poverty 
reduction strategy to compensate the reduction in fuel subsidy, drawing lessons from the 
experience of the CCT programs in several Latin American countries. It is interesting that 
PKH actually adopted the design of Mexico’s PROGRESA with slight modifications 
(Hutagalung et al. 2009) and also Brazils’s Bolsa Familia ,  
The Hopeful Family Program was introduced in 2007 by the Government of Indonesia and 
has been part of the development strategy of the government under the Medium-Term 
Development Plan. This is the first household-based Conditional Cash Transfer program in 
this country.18 The program was launched as a pilot program initially commencing in 40 
districts across 7 provinces (West Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, North 
Sulawesi, Gorontalo and East Nusa Tenggara, excluding the rich districts) (Miranti, 
Vidyattama, Hansnata, Cassells, & Duncan, 2013). Following the establishment of the 
National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K), under the Vice 
President’s responsibility, with the Presidential Regulation No 15/2010, PKH has become 
one of the key social assistance programs in Indonesia. The tasks of this national team 
together with the implementing agencies are to not only to design and plan the poverty 
reduction policies and program, but also to harmonize and integrate these programs, to 
supervise and to control the implementation.  
 
Accordingly, under the TNP2K, there are three Clusters under this integrated poverty 
reduction program (Miranti et al., 2013; Widianto, 2012) where PKH is included under the 
first Cluster which focuses on households (see Appendix for further discussion on the 
Clusters). 
In line with other CCT programs around the world, the PKH aims not only to reduce current 
poverty but also to increase the quality of human capital among the poor households (World 
Bank, 2011). The program delivers quarterly cash benefit to the extremely poor households 
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with school aged children up to 18 years and/or households with pregnant or lactating women 
(World Bank, 2012b). The benefits are usually paid directly to the mother or another adult 
woman in the household. Eligibility of households are verified regularly through school 
enrolment and attendance (for school aged children, regular health check-ups, nutritional 
status, infant immunization for younger children aged 0-6 years, and monitoring pregnant 
women.  
Up to 2012, the financial benefits for households ranged between IDR 0.6 -2.2 million ( 
(approximately US$61-225) per year , or on average IDR 1.4 million (approximately 
US$143) per year per household which is equivalent to the average of the 30 % of poverty 
line. Since 2013 the benefits have increased to IDR 0.8-2.8 million (approximately US$66-
$230) per year or IDR 1.8 million (approximately US$148) on average per household per 
year. The executing agency is the Ministry of Social Affairs with support partners from the 
Indonesian Statistical Agency (BPS for assistance in targeting and eligibility), Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of 
Education). As Indonesia is experiencing the Decentralization era, local governments are also 
expected to deliver strong support in terms of willingness to participate in the program and 
also readiness in terms of supply of services to the PKH program before the program can be 
implemented in their areas (World Bank, 2011).   
The program is targeted using a combination of geographic, proxy means-tested and 
demographic mechanisms (Fiszbein and Schady., 2009). The changes that occurred to this 
program related to targeting were mainly on the expansion of the number of geographic areas 
this program covers and the efforts undertaken to minimize the exclusion errors. The 
geographic targeting was applied in choosing the initial 7 provinces based on (i) the 
expression of interest of the provinces to commit to the implementation of the program and 
(ii) a combination of socio-economic characteristics of areas such as the regional poverty 
rates, nutritional status, transition rates from primary to secondary school and the availability 
of health and education services. To minimize the inclusion errors, the richest 20 % of the 
districts in each province were excluded from this PKH program.  
In its development to expand the type of geographical areas represented (for example urban 
vs rural areas, inlands vs coastal areas), in 2008, the Government expanded PKH to include 
additional six provinces and by the end of 2012, the coverage of the program has expanded to 
cover all of the 33 provinces, but with only 169 out of total 497 districts covering over 1.454 
million households. PKH program is expected to continue until 2015 and there has been a 
plan to increase coverage to a number of districts and households included. Nevertheless, the 
target set by the end of 2014 which is to reach 3.2 million households is still far less below 
the 7.2 million households recorded according the PPLS data in 2011. 
After geographic targeting, the Statistical Agency of Indonesia (Biro Pusat Statistik/BPS) 
uses a combination of economic and asset-based poverty measurements (proxy means tested)  
to determine the targeted households that are classified as eligible for  the program with the 
following details (Nazara & Rahayu, 2013; World Bank, 2011): 
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• Prepared the list of extremely the poor, initially based on the 2005 ‘Unconditional 
Cash Transfer Program’ (UCT) beneficiaries list (PPLS 2005 – (Pendataan Program 
Perlindungan Sosial/Data Collection for Targeting Social Protection Programs). The 
list usually covers the population in the lowest income distribution. The list was 
updated in 2008 and 2011. The later data is the Unified Database that will be 
discussed later on. 
• BPS conducted the interview or verification on the field based on the list to minimize 
the exclusion errors  
• BPS conducted the proxy-means test to identify the extremely poor households. This 
might cover those households who were initially not included in the list of UCT 
program 
• BPS and PKH implementation unit then conducted health and education survey data 
(SPDKP – Survey Pendidikan dan Survey Pelayanan Dasar Kesehatan dan 
Pendidikan) to identify the eligible beneficiaries, i.e. households with school aged 
children and/or the lactating or pregnant women.  
In terms of assessing the effectiveness of the PKH targeting, the World Bank (2012a) argues 
that unfortunately, sufficient data have not been available so it is rather difficult to summarise 
the extent of exclusion or inclusion errors. In particular, the SUSENAS data (Indonesian 
Household’s Socio-Economic Survey data) which contain data on other social protection 
programs such as health insurance (Jamkesmas/Askeskin) do not ask whether households are 
the recipients of the PKH program in its questionnaire. Nevertheless, Hannigan (2011) has 
provided some evidence in regard to the incidence of exclusion errors of the PKH program in 
several areas in Indonesia. For example, in Uabanga, in the province of Gorontalo, only 21 % 
of households who were assessed by the village officials as eligible beneficiaries, actually 
participated in the programs. Similar evidence is found in South Central Timor in the poor 
region of East Nusatenggara which experience substantial exclusion errors in the 
implementation of the PKH program. This is mainly because everyone in this region 
perceived themselves as poor (Hannigan, 2011). Further, there has been critique in regard to 
the use of housing characteristics such as floor and wall types to represent household’s 
welfare to identify the beneficiaries in this region, which some respondents in this area felt 
that this does not accurately reflect their income status.  
Several field experiments have been done particularly by the BPS, the World Bank and J-
PAL to assess the effectiveness of the targeting methods, particularly the community and 
self-targeting methods in terms of the implementation of the PKH program. The findings 
show that the applications of both methods may be beneficial to capture more the extremely 
poor population with higher satisfaction was noted  for the community targeting mechanism 
as the local needs/information are likely to be more incorporated such as input of the 
community members on whom should be included as the program beneficiaries is taken into 
account (World Bank, 2012a).  
In terms of data improvement, TNP2K recently, has spent substantial efforts to improve the 
integrated national targeting of social assistance program by developing an integrated 
database which contains information about the characteristics of the population who are 
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likely to be the most appropriate beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs. This creation 
of the PPLS 2011 Integrated and Unified database, which consists the population who are in 
the lowest 40 % based on social and economic characteristics has an aim to improve 
knowledge and targeting of various social protection programs. Since 2012, PPLS 2011 has 
been used for targeting the PKH. 
So, what are the impacts of PKH on education? Interestingly, while there is some impact of 
the PKH program on health such as attendance to pre-natal visits,  the impact of the PKH 
program on education was still considered limited as PKH would only increase the hours 
spent at school for those children who were already at school, including increasing the 
attendance by 0.2 percentage points (Nazara & Rahayu, 2013). There were no significant 
changes in new school attendances, drop-out or transition rates from elementary to junior 
high school. The World Bank (2012b) has argued that this was likely because the lateness of 
the benefits paid which was not coincided with the academic year where the school fee was 
usually due. Nazara and Rahayu (2013) also argue that the amount allocated for enrolment in 
junior high school is considered as too low therefore it creates less-incentive for the primary 
school children to continue to junior secondary school. Further, the estimation provided by 
the World Bank (2012b) has evaluated that the actual benefit values of the PKH program is 
actually only 13 % of household poverty line and this has been considered as too low.  
The literature also has noted some other challenges, including insufficient socialization of the 
program to the participants that there has been lack of awareness from the intended 
beneficiaries and monitoring compliance (World Bank, 2012a). Lack of the coordination 
between central and local governments and lack of coordination across agencies have also 
been essential issues. Hutagalung et al.(2009) argue that PKH targeting would have been 
more effective in the areas where the supply side of the services is stronger or where the 
availability of infrastructure is better (Nazara and Rahayu, 2013).  Further, many eligible 
beneficiaries also experience difficulties to access health and education services due to the 
high transport costs and long distance from particularly remote areas.   
 
South Africa  
The South African Child Support Grant (CSG) is the largest social cash transfer program in 
this country, providing grants to children from poor households (Michael Samson et al., 
2011; South Africa. Department of Social Development & UNICEF, 2012). It was first 
introduced in 1998 following a recommendation of the Lund Committee which reviewed 
social protection systems in South Africa at that time. The Lund Committee has suggested 
this Grant to replace the limited State Maintenance Grant (SMG) which was considered as 
unsuccessful particularly due to low take up of the SMG for various reasons including the 
lack of knowledge of the eligible beneficiaries, travel limitation and other administrative 
problems. The initial objective of the CSG program was to target and provide the benefit for 
children in the poorest 30% of the households, particularly to provide source of income to the 
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primary caregivers of the targeted children for their health and education (South Africa 
Department of Social Development & UNICEF, 2012; Woolard, Harttgen, & Klasen, 2011).  
Initially, the CSG was intended to be conditional cash transfer program where the eligible 
applicants would need to participate in a particular child development program and to provide 
proof that their children were immunized (Heinrich, Hoddinott, & Samson, 2012; Woolard et 
al., 2011). However, these conditions were hard to be implemented and were discontinued as 
these have in fact created obstacles for poor households to participate particularly those who 
lived in remote rural areas. At the beginning the grant was also unconditional on school 
enrollment given that the school enrollment rates in South Africa were relatively high, but in 
its development, since the beginning of 2010, formally this grant has become conditional on 
children’s school enrolment.  Interestingly, in practice there has not been sanction/penalty 
imposed if this condition is not met (Woolard et al. 2011, p. 363). 
The Grant has been delivered using means test and demographic targeting methods. The 
implementation is administered by a national government agency called the South African 
Social Security Agency (SASSA) which has both national and provincial offices. This agency 
is monitored and evaluated by the national Department for Social Development (DSD). 
In its development, this grant has also experienced several changes over time, with a strong 
focus to increase the take-up rates, as the take-up rates were considered low during the early 
years of the implementation. These changes include the refinement of income threshold, type 
of income included and the age limit. The targeting method adopted is based on the means 
income test, initially based on household income and whether the beneficiaries live in either 
urban or rural areas. Initially the threshold was set at R800 (approximately US$117) per 
month for those who live in the rural areas and R1100 (approximately US$160) per month for 
those who live in the urban areas. Delany et al. (2008) argue that that the variance between 
rural and urban areas is that rural areas are relatively more disadvantaged in terms of access 
to education, health and employment opportunities. Surprisingly, there have been no changes 
in the nominal term of the income thresholds, as the thresholds did not follow the inflation. 
(Samson et al.,2006 and Proudlock, 2011; South Africa, Department of Social Development 
and UNICEF, 2012). Only after strong advocacy from civil society groups and strong 
research evidence, in 2008, the threshold was adjusted to be equal to ten times the value of 
the grant and since then the grant amount and the threshold would follow the inflation. In 
2008, the threshold was adjusted to R2200 (approximately US$236)  per month.  
In its development, to increase the number of eligible families, the grant eligibility was 
determined based on personal income with only the primary caregiver’s and spouse’s income 
(if any,  net of other social assistance grant) being counted. The type of income used was not 
based on total household income anymore. Delany et al. (2008) has argued that household 
income may not represent the equality within a household as the income may not be equally 
distributed among the household members.  
In terms of age eligibility, initially it was set up for children younger than 7 years of age. 
Nevertheless, due to the low take-up rate in the early years of the implementation, there were 
24 
 
calls made through a committee of inquiry in the South African Government (Department or 
Social Development) in 2000 to extend the eligible age of the children. With strong civil 
society campaigns focusing on human rights, the age limit was extended to 14 years in 2003 
and the limit was extended again to 15 years in 2009 and to 18 years to cover all children 
defined by the Constitution (Delany et al., 2008; Woolard et al., 2011). 
The role of civil society to initiate and campaign for the changes is crucial and has 
contributed strongly to the expansion of this program (Proudlock, 2011). This has made the 
case of South Africa unique, different from the other programs discussed in our case studies 
which were launched as either as responses to global shocks and largely donor driven. 
The take up rates of CSG beneficiaries have been increasing substantially over time. Initially 
after two years after the program was introduced, the take up recipients were only 150,000 
children in 2000 (Woolard et al. 2011), while the initial target set up by the Lund Committee 
was at 1.5 million children (Proudlock, 2011). The take-up rates remained low in the early 
years of the implementation and only in 2002, the take-up surpassed the target with 1.8 
million of children receiving the benefit. Nevertheless, with all the reforms or changes 
explained above which have aims to increase the take-up beneficiaries, since then the number 
of children receiving the Child Support Grant have increased substantially from around 7 
million of children in 2005/2006 to almost 9.5 million of them in 2009/2010. The CSG 
beneficiaries have grown by 7.5 % per annum during this period.  
As explained previously, there are two targeting errors in the Social Assistance Program. In 
comparison with other selected countries, the data compiled by the OECD (2010) and 
Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) shown that the errors of inclusion (those who indicated have 
received the grant but in fact did not qualify for the grant – leakage) of the CSG was lower at 
only 2 % while it was 28 % for the errors of exclusion (those who were eligible to receive the 
grant but did not receive it) in 2008.19 This was a significant improvement as indicated in 
Samson et al. (2006) using the national data from Statistics of South Africa reported that the 
exclusion errors was more than 90 % in 2000 and it was around 42.5 % in 2004. 
Delany et al. (2008) identified several reasons for possible exclusion errors and those 
included lack of required documentation (for example delay in getting birth certificate not 
directly after birth), lack of knowledge about the CSG or how to apply, lack of interest as the 
amount of the grant provided was not sufficient enough after taking into account other costs, 
intend to apply but not yet to apply and self-selection and thinking that the prospective 
beneficiaries were not eligible to receive the grant or from the supply side that there has been 
complex and slow bureaucracy (Financial and Fiscal Commision, 2013). 
 
  
                                                          
19 It is important to note that there are different concepts underlying lowest income quintiles data, with some approaches 
may use income (perceived capability) perspective and others may be based upon actual consumption or in terms of cut-
off used.   
25 
 
Figure 2.  Errors of exclusion and inclusion, CSG and other programs 
 
 
Source: OECD (2010); Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.  Note: * refers 
to income cut off at USD PP 2.5. 
 
In terms of the impacts of the CSG on education, numerous studies mostly indicated the 
positive impacts with strong gender implications towards enhancing girls’ education. These 
are the success stories of the CSG effectiveness despite the facts that the grant did not impose 
strict conditionality to the beneficiaries. The program evaluations have found that CSG has 
increased school attendance and reduced the self-reported hunger for children (in comparison 
to children in poor households but did not receive the grant) as argued by Samson et al. 
(2011). This study also finds there was a shift in the behavior in terms of child schooling-
child labour trade off among children who received the CSG that this has reduced their 
likelihood of them to work in cultivating the land instead.  Enrolling early (at birth) into the 
CSG program also had a significant impact on girls to increase the grade attainment by one 
quarter of grade compared to girls who just enrolled to the program at the age of six (4.27 at 
birth vs. 4.02 if enrolling at the age of six), but not for boys  (3.99 at birth vs. 3.95 if enrolling 
at the age of six) (Heinrich et al., 2012). The data also shows that there were higher 
proportion of girls (2.3 %) than boys (0.3 %) who attained Grade 6 as the highest grade 
attained. Further, around 50.5 % of girls had Grade 4 as the highest grade attained in 
comparison to 49.7 % of boys.  Delany et al. (2008) also find that there were not significant 
differences between CSG and non CSG beneficiaries of children aged 7-13 years in terms of 
paying or not paying the school fees (the study was carried out at the same time that the non-
fee schools at the primary level were rolled out in selected areas in South Africa so it is not 
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relevant to argue that the non-significant difference between the CSG and non-CSG 
beneficiaries may be because the beneficiaries attend the non-fee schools).               
Despite its positive impacts, there is still room for improvement the implementation of CSG 
particularly to address the exclusion errors. More efforts should be focused to ensure children 
and the primary caregivers are able to access the documents required for the CSG application, 
efforts to improve the information delivery in particular if there were changes in the 
regulation, and in general to improve the accessibility to the program for those living in rural 
areas, such as access to basic services and traveling time. Another challenge that would need 
to be improved is to increase the number of CSG received by maternal orphans as the 
proportion of the beneficiaries among this type was still very low (20 %) in comparison to 
proportion of children with paternal orphans (60 %) as discussed in Woolard et al. (2011). 
This may be related to the evidence that Case et al. (2004) have found that the likelihood of a 
child receiving a grant declines without a presence of the mother who is the caregiver of the 
child. 
 
Conclusion: Key priorities for policies and programmes related to a post-2015 agenda  
While important improvements have been made in education enrollment and attendance 
among primary and secondary school, full coverage of primary schooling has not been 
reached and important lags remain for secondary schooling enrollment.  During the last 
decade there has been an important expansion of social protection programs aimed at 
attracting and keeping children and youth in school.   
By far the most popular social protection programs aimed to support children’s education in 
the last decade are CCT programs.  In most settings, this policy tool has proven to improve 
enrollment and attendance rates.  However, two main challenges remain: first, CCTs are not 
always reaching those most in need and therefore further efforts should be made to increase 
coverage and reduce leakage so that public funds are efficiently spent. Second, CCTs have 
not proven to increase in a substantial amount school attainment and learning outcomes, 
therefore innovation on the design of these programs is needed so that education of quality is 
offered to children who enroll and attend school as a consequence of demand-side incentives. 
There are over 100 programs worldwide aimed at improving education enrollment with 
different maturity phases (e.g. Indonesia’s PKH  may be considered as a young program in 
comparison to Bolsa Familia). Nevertheless, regardless the maturity phases, similar 
challenges are found in terms of targeting, including the existence of both exclusion and 
inclusion errors. These errors cannot be completely eliminated, and there is always a tradeoff: 
inclusion errors will increase as coverage increases (Paes-Sousa et al., 2013; Stampini & 
Tornarolli, 2012).  The main challenge is therefore, how to increase coverage (minimize 
exclusion errors) with the least amount of inclusion errors. 
As the cases in this document show, targeting is a complex process, and there is no single 
recipe for the best targeting method. The general results show, however, that the combination 
of several (up to three) targeting methods improves targeting performance.  Also, we find 
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some key elements that may help to reduce inclusion errors: 1) have data verification systems 
to check accuracy of information provided by families, 2) include data that are not easy to 
manipulate (in informal settings as much of developing countries with high rates of informal 
labor, income is difficult to measure and verify, and therefore easy to manipulate); 3) in 
settings of decentralization (as much of the cases covered here) having a centralized 
information system is key in order to reduce risks of clientelism and political capture; 4) 
transparency of the targeting process, including making public the list of beneficiaries may 
help reduce inclusion errors because there is higher social control; 5) have a permanent data 
updating process in order to identify those who do not need the program anymore (some 
countries like Brazil have the recertification process for this matter.  In most countries, 
however, there are no clear program exit rules and therefore more structural incentives must 
be built into the design of the programs so that program exit does not imply a lost).  
We also find some keys elements of a targeting system that may help to reduce exclusion 
errors: 1) have strong communication systems (campaigns) so that potential beneficiaries 
know about the programs and register; 2) have permanent registration spots, so that eligible 
families (or individuals) can have the opportunity at any time to access the program; 3) have 
registration spots that are accessible to people (in terms of distance and transportation costs); 
4) be careful at documentation requirements (some people do not meet documentation 
requirements and get excluded, which is contradictory if we want to reach the poorest, who 
are more likely to lack essential documents such as birth certificates).  
The implementation of these elements can improve targeting performance but they may also 
be costly in terms of financial resources and human capacity.  As it is shown in this document 
for the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia and South Africa, it also requires time to learn 
from implementation results and refine tools to minimize targeting errors.  Very low-income 
countries may not have all the resources needed to implement an efficient targeting system in 
the short term.  In that context, it may be helpful to start by targeting social protection 
programs using less costly mechanisms such as geographic targeting in the short term and 
then, one minimum coverage rates are attained, use a combination with means-tested 
mechanisms that provide more information but also require higher capacity. 
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Appendix  
 
Methodology of Coady et al. (2004) database 
In constructing the database, Coady et al. (2004) focus much on the programs in low or 
middle income countries which their main objective is to reduce the poverty (although the 
database also include programs with other objectives in addition to poverty reduction). In 
summary, the criteria adopted in constructing the database is as follows: 
• Programs included range from cash transfers (welfare and social assistance, child 
benefits and noncontributory pensions), near-cash transfers (such as food rations and 
food stamps), food transfers, food and non-food subsidies, public works and social 
funds (Coady et al. 2004a, p. 20).  
• The first selection of the database is based on the literature review of search engines 
of World Bank, Eldis and IFPRI plus some academic publications for the years 1990-
2002.  
• What is interesting from this database is that the database contains at least one 
information of the indicator of targeting performance, that is the proportion of total 
transfers received by households which are in the 10, 20, 40 % of the national 
income/consumption distribution; the proportion of the beneficiaries who are in the 
bottom 10, 20, 40 % of the national income/consumption distribution or the 
proportion of total transfers or beneficiaries that reach some target “poor” groups who 
usually cover households in the bottom income/consumption distribution (for example 
bottom 20 or 40 %).  
• The information above will be useful to calculate the targeting performance which is 
the ratio of percentage of population to the percentage of transfers received by that 
respective population. The universal value of 1 means for example that the bottom 40 
% of the population would receive 40 % of the transfer income. A value less than 1 
means a regressive transfer program, while on the opposite a value more than 1 means 
a progressive transfer program. 
• Based on the criteria above, there are 122 programs that are selected form 48 
countries.  
Three Cluster of Poverty Alleviation Program in Indonesia 
Cluster 1: Poverty Reduction Program Targeted to Household (Households Centered 
Integrated Social Assistance), where PKH is one of the programs complementary with Rice 
to the Poor (Raskin), Health Service Insurance (Jamkesmas) and Education and School 
Assistance (BOS and BOM) 
Cluster 2: Poverty Reduction Program Targeted to Community (Community Based Poverty 
Reduction Program – PNPM) 
Cluster 3: Poverty Reduction Program Targeted to Micro and Small Sized Enterprises 
(Microfinance). 
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Table A1. Conditional Cash Transfer, selected programs and percentage of administrative costs 
Program Country Year % total cost Baseline enrollment Education Outcomes
Primary Education Stipend 
Program Bangladesh 2002 4
Geographic 
targeting combined 
with community 
assessment
Poor families with children of 
primary-school age
N/A Negligible impacts on school 
enrollments
Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano Ecuador 2005 4.1
Proxy means 
testing
Households with children aged 
0–16/17 in the poorest 2 
quintiles, and poor households 
with elderly and/or disabled 
members
75.20% Enrollment increased by 10.3 
percentage points - ages 6-17
Solidaridad
Dominican 
Republic 2006 5.9
Proxy means 
testing
Households with children aged 
0–16/17 in the poorest 2 
quintiles, and poor households 
with elderly and/or disabled 
members
71.00%
Enrollment increased by 6 
percentage points for the poor
PROGRESA/Oportunidades Mexico 2003 6
Geographic and 
Poverty
Households in extreme poverty
90-94% for boys and girls 
primary school enrollment; 
67% for girls and 73% for 
boys for the secondary 
school enrollment
Primary school enrollment 
increased by 0.96-1.45 
percentage points for female and 
by 0.74-1.07 percentage points 
for male. Secondary school 
enrollment increased by 7.2-9.3 
percentage points for female and 
by 3.5-5.8 percentage points for 
male. In another impact 
evaluation, the result shows that 
enrollment increased by 1.9 
percentage points for children in 
Grades 0-5; 8.7 percentage points 
for children in Grade 6; 0.6 
percentage points for children in 
Grades 7-9
Child Support Program 
(CSP) Pakistan 2005/2006 6.7
Proxy means 
testing
Households; Food Support 
Program (FSP) beneficiaries with 
children aged 5–12
44.39% total; 37.78% female; 
50% male; 40.80% for the 
poorest 40% and 47.95% for 
the top 60%
Enrollment increased by 11.65 
percentage points in total; female 
is higher (13.74 percentage 
points); male (9.06 percentage 
points). By income distribution, 
enrollment rates for the poorest 
40 per cent of households 
increased by 12.3 percentage 
points compared with children 
from the top 60 per cent at 10.85 
percentage points
Targeting Method
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Table A1. Continued 
Source: Authors’ modification based on  Grosh et al. (2008); Ahmed (2005); Baulch (2011); Attanasio et al.(2005) Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Glewwe and 
Kassouf (2012); Levy and Ohls (2007); Lindert, Skofias and Shapiro(2006); Perova and Vakis (2009) ; Schady and Araujo (2008); Schultz (2004) ; Scott et al. 
(2011); Skoufias & Parker (2001); Subran (2011); Rawlings and Rubio (2005); World Bank (Bank, 2006a, 2006b). 
Program Country Year % total cost Baseline enrollment Education Outcomes
Familias en Accion Colombia 2000/4 10.5
Geographic 
targeting and proxy 
means testing
Extremely poor families with 
minors aged 0–6 not 
participating in other programs 
(health subsidy), and/or minors 
aged 7–17 enrolled in school 
(education subsidy); Families in 
the poorest quintile; Elegible 
beneficiaries: Education subsidy: 
7-17 year-old children; Health 
subsidy: 0-6 year-old children
91.7% for children 8-13 and 
63.2% for children ages 14-
17
Enrollment increased by 2.1 
percentage points for children 
ages 8-13 and 5.6  percentege 
points for children ages 14-17.
Juntos Peru 2006 11.6
Geographic 
targeting, proxy 
means testing, and 
community 
validation
Poor households with children 
less than 14 years old
75%  enrollment
An increase of 4 percentage 
points of overall  school 
registration, an increase by 10 
percentage points in enrollment 
for children age 7 and no 
differences for the older age
Bolsa Familia Brazil 2003 12.3
Geographic and 
Poverty
0-15 year-old children, pregnant 
women; Households in extreme 
poverty and poor households 
with children N/A
Enrollment rates increased by 
about 5.5 percentage points in 
grades 1-4 and by about 6.5 
percentage points in grades 5-8. 
Dropout rates declined by about 
0.5 percentage points for 
children in grades 1-4 and by 
about 0.4 percentage points for 
children in grades 5-8 
Path Jamaica 2004/2005 13
Proxy means 
testing
Children aged 0–19 (or until  they 
graduate from secondary school); 
Poor people aged 60 and older; 
Pregnant or lactating women up 
to 6 months after delivery; People 
with disabil ities; Poor adults
18 days
Enrollment increased by 0.5 days 
for children ages 7-17.
Targeting Method
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Table A2. Social protection programs aimed at children’s education 
View this table as separate file 
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